Ancient Skepticism

Ranga Sitaram

29th January 2023

In this essay, I will discuss the philosophical views of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics who claimed to have led a life of no beliefs. I will analyze their approach to debating with dogmatic philosophers, the modes of their Skeptical argument, and their way of life as they claimed to be happy and tranquil because of their lack of belief.

Skepticism is derived from the Greek word skepsis, meaning investigation (Vogt, 2022). The ancient Skeptics took to investigation and inquiry as their way of life. The growth of Skepticism was encouraged by the arguments of the Presocratic philosophers, such as Xenophanes and Heraclitus. They were opposed to the ‘theologians’ for using myths and stories instead of rational arguments and proofs to support their claims of the role of gods in the natural happenings in the world (Irwin, 1999). Xenophanes was particularly critical of Homer and Hesiod, whose poems maintained that the origin and laws of the natural world are determined by the gods and that their poems are believable because they were revealed by the gods. However, Xenophanes argued that Homer and Hesiod’s poems present gods as acting immorally, but as gods do not act immorally, it is hard to believe what their poems claim. Instead, Xenophanes contended that reason and inquiry should be the basis of understanding the world (Irwin, 1999).

The Atomists, like Democritus, believed that object properties, such as color, sound, taste, and smell, are not real properties but outcomes of our sense perception (Berryman, 2016). For the Atomists, the only existent things are atoms. Things in the world are formed by the varied arrangements of atoms. The differences in our sense perception emerge out of the differences in the interactions of the different patterns of atoms from the external world with the arrangement of atoms in our bodies. However, the Skeptics questioned this notion by arguing that contradictory sense perceptions of the same external object (e.g., hot and cold perception of water) by two different individuals might lead to the conclusion that a thing in the world may have conflicting appearances. The Skeptics often highlighted the problems of conflicting appearances, such as in the above example, to point out that sense perceptions are merely subjective opinions and not truths (Irwin, 1999).

The Skeptics further questioned whether it was possible to determine the truth by reason. They contested that as an argument for a position can be countered by an equally forceful argument against it by another position, one cannot ascertain one or the other position as being true. According to the Skeptics, we must suspend belief in the truth of the positions. Taking the example of Homer and Hesiod vs. Xenophanes, they argued that since arguments from both sides are forceful, it is impossible to posit the truth. Hence, we must suspend belief in the role of gods or reason in understanding the natural world. Hence, the Skeptics’ position is that as one cannot justify belief in a position by arguing this way or that way, one must not hold a belief in either.

The Skeptics raised a critical philosophical question as to whether reason or experience (i.e., sense perception) is the basis for our doubts in holding a position. Other Presocratic philosophers, notably Parmenides and Heraclitus, had also argued against basing truth on sense perception. While Parmenides doubted all sense perception, Heraclitus criticized common and traditional beliefs and sought to clarify that senses, such as seeing, hearing, and touch, are unreliable sources of belief formation (Irwin, 1999) and that we should use critical reasoning to arrive at the truth.

Later in his work, Meno, Plato attempted to clarify the distinction between belief (doxa in Greek) and knowledge (episteme) (Irwin, 1999). According to his formulation, true beliefs are those when we get something right by guesswork, luck, or habit without knowing its reasons. Knowledge is a true belief that is justified by training, technique, craft, and expertise. Hence, according to this definition, knowledge is reliable, rigorous, and rational.

The Skeptics argued that neither sense perception nor reason could bring about any knowledge of the world. In other words, for the Skeptics, the certainty of knowledge is impossible. The Skeptics held that having a belief was associated with the pressures of defending their position leading to anxiety and unhappiness. For the Skeptics, therefore, a life of not believing in anything gives them a tranquil state of mind and happiness. It is to be noted that even this insistence of the Skeptics in not holding any belief was itself a belief in the concept of non-belief. This aspect of dogmatism in their non-belief was criticized by later philosophers.

The Skeptics followed the Socratic elenctic method of engaging in an argument involving questioning and refutation to tease out underlying assumptions and beliefs tacitly held by the interlocutor (Irwin, 1999). A particularly famous method of skeptical argumentation comes from a later Skeptic called Agrippa (~300 AD), who questioned the basis for establishing the Criterion of Truth. The objection is named Agrippa’s Trilemma, which states that attempts to support a belief lead to one of the following three problems: a circular argument in finding support for the belief, an infinite chain of regress, or an assumption that cannot be supported anymore. By the elenctic method, the Skeptics identify the interlocutor’s beliefs that lead to contradictions to demonstrate the uselessness of attempts to gain knowledge, leading to puzzlement (aporia). The Skeptics’ suspension of judgment (epoche) implies a lack of belief in any position.

The Skeptics held that suspension of judgment leads to ataraxia,  meaning absolute peace of mind. For the Skeptics, ataraxia arises from the suspension of judgment, which means that there is no longer any need to argue for or against a position and hence eliminates any need for anger or irritation about other people’s political, religious, or other views. 

Bibliography

1. Irwin, Terence (ed.), “Classical Philosophy”, Oxford University Press, 1999.
2. Vogt, Katja, “Ancient Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).
3. Berryman, Sylvia, “Democritus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)